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ABSTRACT
Reducing state-owned corporate share has recently 
stimulated a new Merger and Acquisition wave in China. Li 
Rongrong, Minister of the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC), explained that opening up state-owned 
shares aimed at restructuring and reforming state 
enterprises by making use of foreign capital more quickly 
and effectively (Feng, 2003) . Among varies types of Merger
and Acquisition activities, Management Buyout recently 
emerged as a new tool for management and foreign investors 
to acquire state-owned enterprises and it is also
considered the most effective financial vehicles for state
government to reduce state-owned corporate shares. This 
paper explored the differences of Management Buyout in
between China and United States. Since China has different
economic environment, government infrastructure, and legal
system from United States, investors claimed it might 
cause different Management Buyout procedures and results
in China from what it is in United States. After careful
exam current Management Buyout practice in China, the 
paper concluded that Management Buyout in China has been 
defined with new meanings. Management Buyout was 
originally created to increase efficiency and reduce 
agency cost in United States in 1960s. But Management
iii
Buyout in China is a merely tool to provide Incentive 
programs for current management team and reduce
state-owned corporate shares.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION OF THE PROJECT
Introduction
Leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions can be defined as 
acquisitions of significant equity stake of an enterprise 
by private venture capital investors using additional debt 
financing and comprise both the case of the Management 
Buyout (MBO), in which the current management seeks help 
from outside providers of both debt and equity capital to 
take over the equity of the company from its previous 
owners, and the Management Buy-In (MBI), in which an 
external management team funded by outside investors takes 
over the control of a given target company (Gottschalg,
2002) .
Leveraged Buyout originated in United States during 
1960s, reached peak in 1980s, and then declined 
dramatically in 1990s. Management Buyouts as a special 
kind of Leveraged Buyout has just gained its popularity in
China.
Though the concept of Management Buyout has been 
accepted by management and investors in China, many 
questions still remained unsolved, especially in the areas
1
of regulatory framework of Management Buyout, sources of 
funds, and valuation.
Purpose of the Project
Management Buyout in China is still in its infant 
stage. The objective of this study is to provide an 
overview of Management Buyout in China through comparing 
the differences of Management Buyout processes in between 
United States and China, in order to identify the real 
purpose and procedure of Management Buyout in China.
Scope of the Study
The targets of Management Buyout in China usually can 
be divided into three major categories: (I) public company
taken private (this is usually the takeover type of the 
Leveraged Buyout transaction), (II) public companies 
spinning off divisions, and (III) non-public traded 
companies transactions. And the companies in these three 
categories can be either state and collective-owned or 
private-owned. Most Management Buyout targets in China 
were state-owned and collective-owned companies. Since
State-owned companies usually have better access to 
capital market and the ability to influent policy-makers, 
they actually have more "hidden value" than
non-state-owned companies. These "hidden value" make them
2
more attractive than other type of companies, however it 
also makes them more difficult to evaluate. This paper 
focused on the Management Buyout of state-owned public
companies.
Significance of the Project 
Management Buyout is a recent phenomenon in China and
start receiving attention from academic perspective. Most 
discussion on Management Buyout in China is merely focused 
on its benefits to Chinese enterprises, rather than 
exploring the potential risks associated with Management 
Buyout. In fact, without recognizing the differences of 
Management Buyout between in China and United States, the 
real meaning and purpose of Management Buyout in China can
not be fully understood by investors. This paper
summarized current viewpoints and discussions in China 
regarding Management Buyout, and expanded discussion
further into areas such as valuation and ownership
structure.
Limitation of the Project
Currently, there are not many Merger and Acquisition 
activities fall into Management Buyout category. And many 
Management Buyout (mostly are state-owned companies) of 
private companies were not aware by the public. Statistic
3
data from governmental sources and third party sources are 
not sufficient enough to support in depth research. 
Information in this paper is collected through Internet, 
newspaper, stock exchange, and governmental publications.
4
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Management Buyout Improves Corporate Governance 
The major advantage of Leveraged Buyout or Management
Buyout perceived by China government was its effect on 
improving corporate governance. Leveraged Buyout forces 
organization's corporate governance change by adding 
large-block equity investors to the firm's board of 
directors, and therefore actively monitors management's 
performance (Palepu, 1990). Agency theory provided 
fundamental framework for this point of view. Agency
theory concerned the contractual problems that occurs "one
or more persons' engage another person and to perform some 
services on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Based on Agency theory, both parties, principles 
and agents, are dedicated to maximize their own benefits.
Agency theory concludes that the- agent does not always act 
in the best interest of the principal. The principal can 
reduce divergent agent behavior through control
mechanisms, incentives for desired behavior and reducing
discretionary decision space, with a cost to principal.
The difference between total loss from divergent behavior
5
termed as "agency costs" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Agency 
costs varied depends on individual company's controlling 
system, governance structure, and incentive programs, 
which could be overwhelming (Smith, 1990). Leveraged 
Buyout activities can change the determinants of agency 
cost (Jensen, 1986) . Therefore, Leveraged Buyouts have a 
significant impact on the firm's agency costs (Kaplan,
1989). However, the number and type of firms that can be 
revitalized through Leveraged Buyout is limited. Leveraged
Buyouts are appropriate solutions to corporate governance
problems for only some public corporations. Government 
should set policy to encourage other vehicles for 
improving the governance of public corporations (Long &
Ravenscraft, 1993) .
Management Buyout Improves Management 
Incentive Program
Jensen (1989) concluded that the leveraged buyout 
organization creates' an incentive structure that is 
superior to typical public corporation in lower growth 
industries. Leveraged buyout organizations typically have
high financial leverage, high.managerial equity ownership,
and monitoring by active investors such LBO sponsors.
Under this viewpoint, increased management ownership and
high financial leverage of buyout organization generated
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strong incentives for managers to produce higher cash 
flows through improved operational results after leveraged 
buyout transaction. The high financial leverage also 
limits the possibility that managers invest free cash flow 
into unproductive investments because it is committed to 
serving the debt. Rappaport (1990) disagreed with Jensen 
that the LBO organization is superior to the public 
corporation (Rappaport, 1990). He argues that the high 
level of debt and concentrated ownership caused
inflexibility to competition and change. And the typical 
active investor invests funds provided by outside 
investors who expect to be repaid in five to ten years. 
Therefore, Rappaport argues, buyouts are inherently 
transitory organizations. Rappaport also added that alone 
with managers' equity stakes increases in value, they also
bear an increasing amount of .undiversified risk. Over 
time, one exit strategy managers can employ to reduce or 
diversify this risk is to allow the company goes public 
again. Kaplan (1991) also finds that approximately 45% of 
the large LBOs completed between 1979 and 1986 returned to 
public ownership at some time prior to August 1990 (Kaplan 
& Stein, 1991) . However, these firms remained debt and
ownership concentration levels that are substantially 
higher than pre-buyout levels, suggesting that the firms
7
maintain many characteristics of the LBO organization even 
after returning to public ownership status.
8
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The process of the Management Buyout of public-traded 
companies (mostly state-owned) in China was compared with
in United States. These data of these Chinese
public-traded companies were collected through Sheng Zhen 
Stock Exchange. The research was divided into three steps. 
At first, 30 public traded companies were randomly
selected, which were listed either by Sheng Zhen Stock
Exchange or Shanghai Stock Exchange in Merger &
Acquisition category. Varies industries and type of the
businesses were included in selection. Then the second
step was to send•questionnaires to these selected
companies, and researches their financial information. 7 
companies were finally selected that have completed 
Management Buyout process, and all of them had
announcements about Management Buyout in newspaper and 
annual reports. Then these companies' stock performance
was evaluated based on before and after Management Buyout.
9
CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS AND RESULTS
It is found that public traded companies had quite 
disappointing stock price performance after Management 
Buyout transaction.
Table 1. Stock Price Comparison
Financial Data
Stock price 
change one month 
after Management
Buyout
Stock price 
change one year 
after Management
Buyout
Sheng Fang Da -14.80% -57%
Yu Tong Bus -13.30% -17%
Sheng Li Gu Fen -3.10% 4%
Aomeidi -5.10% -48%
Fu Shu Gu Feng -6.20% -19%
Dong Ting Shui Zhi -6.-20% -12%
Te Bian Dian Gong -15% -21.50%
The stock price percentage change one month after Management 
Buyout transaction compared to stock price percentage change 
one year after Management Buyout, based on Sheng Zhen Exchange 
data
All the companies in our data showed negative stock 
price change in one month after Management Buyout, which 
indicates investors' negative viewpoint toward Management 
Buyout. The stock prices slide even further one year
after. The only exception is Sheng Li Gu Fen.
One of the purposes of Management Buyout is to 
improve the company's operational efficiency and to reduce 
agency cost. The associated changes in organizational
10
ownership structure should improve managers' motivation to
maximize stock value and therefore lead to better
financial outcome. However, our study showed that
Management Buyout in China indeed did just opposite. It 
actually makes managers even more short-term oriented and 
more vulnerable to financial distress. Three assumptions
were summarized based on observation.
The first assumption'is that, from the ownership 
structure perspective, Management Buyout in China did not 
improve management efficiency and effectiveness.
Segregation of ownership and management caused agency 
problem. Management Buyout in China is purposed to 
integrate two parties, stockholders and management, into 
one team. The management team supposed to have the same 
interest as stockholders. Consequently, it should improve 
efficiency, and reduced agency cost. However, after
examination of the ownership structure of Management 
Buyout in China, it was found that management team does 
not have high percentage of ownership as it is in United
States. Management Buyout in United States usually takes 
more than 90% stock ownership, and then "goes private". In 
Management Buyout in China, management team only has 
6%-36% of the total share; none of these companies owned
more than 50% stocks, which is significantly less than
11
Management Buyout in United States. Agency problem will 
still exist after Management Buyout.
Agency problem can exist in two particular areas. The 
first is that the management team can be benefited at 
outside investors' expenses through unfair pricing. Due to 
lack of•sufficient financial monitoring system, Management
Buyout can be utilized as a tool by management to
compensate them, which made agency problem even more
severe. Before the Management Buyout, management can
easily manipulate financial statements and deliberately
minimize net income, reduce revenues and assets on book
prior to Management Buyout. These activities will lower 
the investor expectations, stress the stock price, and
reduce the buyout cost. In the case of Yu Tong Bus
(600066), management deliberately reported loss in
revenue, reduced assets and increased liability before 
Management Buyout. Management of Yu Tong Bus then started 
Management Buyout process when the stock price was
distressed.
The second area is that management can also utilize
insider information to trade their stocks or simply pay 
out more dividends after Management Buyout. It will be 
easier for management to manipulate their stocks than
ever. In all Management Buyout cases, management used
12
personal debt financing, which can be'another cause for 
agency problem. In order to reduce their personal debt, 
management will increase dividends payout ratio to pay 
their personal' debt, which will apparently impact the 
stock performance. Outside investors therefore took the 
negative view of the company and sell off the stocks, 
which caused severely depressed stock price after
Management Buyout.
The second assumption is, from valuation aspect, the 
Management Buyout might be unfair to outside investors and 
foreign investors under current state-owned ownership 
transfer process.
Table 2. Earning per Share Versus Management Hold Shares
Financial Data
EPS % change 
one year after 
Management 
Buyout
Management 
hold shares
Sheng Fang Da -208% 36%
Yu Tong Bus 9% 31%
Sheng Li Gu Fen -30% 6.85%
Aomeidi -40'% ' 22.19%
Fu Shu Gu Feng 41% . 33%
Dong Ting Shui Zhi 5% 12.84%
Te Bian Dian Gong ■ ■ 0% 9.80%
* For the companies completed Management Buyout within last 
year, it represents the EPS % change from last fiscal year to 
current fiscal year.
The total management hold shares and EPS percentage change one 
year after Management Buyout*-, based on Sheng Zhen Exchange 
data.
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Under current practices, state-owned shares were not 
sold to management through public-bidding or trading. 
Instead, they were transferred through negotiated 
contracts between government and management team. It 
becomes a very controversy practice. In most transactions, 
the government, which is usually the largest shareholder, 
transferred stocks it owned to management team at price 
that is much lower than the market price and book value.
Outside investors therefore are accusing the unfairness of 
this type transactions and aggressively promoting 
public-bidding process. As table 3 indicated, except Sheng
Table 3. Acquisition Price Versus Book Value per Share
Completed Management Acquisition Book Value per
Buyout transactions Price (Yuan) Share (Yuan)
Aomedi 2.95 3.81
Aomedi 2nd transaction 3.00 4.07
Sheng Fang Da 3.28 3.45
Sheng Fang Da 2nd 
transaction 3.08 3.45
ST Wan Jia Le 0.84 0.31
Fu Shu Gu Feng 2.95 3.19
Dong Ting Shui Zhi 5.75 5.84
Te Bian Dian Gong 2.50 3.36
Te Bian Dian Gong 2nd 
transaction 3.10 3.36
Te Bian Dian Gong 3rd 
transaction 1.40 3.36
Sheng Li Group 2.27 2.27
* For the companies completed Management Buyout within last 
year, it represents the acquisition price.
The book value per share*, based on Sheng Zhen Exchange data.
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Li Gu Feng (Sheng Li Group) acquired all the state-owned 
shares at price of book value, and ST Wan Jia Le paid 
higher than its book value, the rest companies paid 
acquisition price much lower than book value.
Traditionally, during Management Buyout process, 
stocks were acquired by different interest parties through
different channels with fairness. Different entities can
be composed of shareholder, management, and outsiders. 
However, in China, management team had much more
advantages compare to outside investors and other interest 
parties during Management Buyout. Management usually 
explains the favorable treatment was because their 
contributions to the company have never been properly 
rewarded prior to China's economic reform. Therefore, 
privilege such as favored ownership transfer pricing is
merely a way to reward management team for their past
contributions. Apparently, most outside investors are not
convinced by this argument. This is another reason
investors start selling off stocks of the company after
the company announced Management Buyout.
The solution to reduce the unfairness of ownership
transfer is to require management bid in the public market
for state-owned shares. It can reduce information
asymmetric problems, and therefore lead to fair pricing.
15
Private capital and foreign capital involvement can 
possibly be the impetus that pushes the standardization of 
ownership transfer procedure. In order to attract foreign 
capital and private capital, China government must revise 
its policy and procedures regarding state-owned stock 
transfer. Recent "public company Merger and Acquisition 
procedure" and "Notice of transferring public company 
state-owned shares and legal entities shares to foreign
investors" evidenced this trend. In these new policy and 
procedures, they identified importance of fairness of 
ownership transfer, and provide some regulatory framework 
to regulate certain transactions.
The third assumption is that Management Buyout is not 
a promised exit strategy for state-owned companies.
From the historical experience of many communist
countries', Management Buyout was not a guaranteed exit 
strategy for state-owned companies. Russia and Eastern 
Europe utilized Management Buyout as a major privatize 
tool in 1990s. Management Buyout was considered the most
practical way to transform state-owned companies to
private companies. Indeed, due to the incompleteness of 
government infrastructure and the immature economic 
environment, Management Buyout actually failed badly
afterwards. Russia's 500 state-owned companies valued more
16
Table 4. Debt Ratio Comparison
Financial Data Debt Ratio Prior Debt Ratio
Sheng Fang Da 26% 24.5%
Yu Tong Bus 44.0% 39%
Sheng Li Gu Fen 47% 46%
Aomeidi 67% 66%
Fu Shu Gu Feng 46% 46%
Dong Ting Shui Zhi 34% 23%
Te Bian Dian Gong 61% 49%
Debt ratio comparison before and after Management Buyout, based 
on Sheng Zhen Exchange data
than 1000 billion US dollars at the time, however, only-
sold for 7.2 billion - the loss is tremendous.
In China, after management acquired the control of 
the company through Management Buyout, management can
decide to either create value or simply cash out. As table 
4 indicated, after Management Buyout, companies did not 
have much change in their debt ratio, which indicates that 
these enterprises did not really "leveraged". Managers 
actually used personal savings or personal borrowed funds 
to complete Management Buyout. It can lead to dangerous 
consequences if the management wants to cash out 
immediately after Management Buyout. Management can simply 
pay more dividends to recover their personal savings.
Therefore, under current environment, without correct
infrastructure in place for Management Buyout
17
transactions, purely ownership structure change will not 
provide enough benefits for both government and outside
investors.
18
CHAPTER FIVE
INTRODUCTION OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUT IN CHINA
Brief History of Leveraged Buyout
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Leveraged Buyouts 
were initiated and thrived by a handful of sophisticated 
and visionary financial experts such as Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co. (KKR) and Wesray Capital Corp. (Wesray). The 
value of financial activities through restructuring the 
corporate financial structure was realized by the value 
gap between the acquisition cost of redundant corporate 
assets and their financial value. Through correctly
identified financial tools and vehicle, the return of
these activities were dramatic. On the one hand, the net
investment is very limited in such transactions; on the 
other hand, return can be infinite. Leveraged Buyout firms
achieved significant return that as high as 50 to 125 
percent in net equity investment into transactions.
Value gap, or opportunities existed in 1980s mostly 
came from corporate restructuring activities. Many 
corporations were anxious to align the strategic assets 
and improve efficiency of corporate assets, which caused
by conglomerate wave of late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
buyers for these types of corporate assets were limited by
19
strategic reasons. Corporations must either sell the 
assets at a low price to attract buyers or to continuously 
deteriorate its financial condition. And many times, there 
are no buyers at all. And consequently private firms which 
not have pressures on earning reports become favorite
model for these corporate assets. Leveraged Buyout
therefore emerged as a lifesaver for these corporations 
because the targets of Leveraged Buyout firms are merely 
to reach the acceptable rate of return, rather than
earning report.
Leveraged Buyout firms have its prime time in 1980s
because of the economic environment. Interest rate was a
important factor support Leveraged Buyout. However, after
1980s, failure rate skyrocket in Leveraged Buyout
transactions, partially because Leveraged Buyout business
became more of a fund-raising than an investment
management business. In 1990s, despite the high price of 
Merger and Acquisitions, principles of Leveraged Buyout 
firms continuously contribute their equity into poorly
balanced firms without careful evaluation of their return
potential. Therefore, many investments were doomed to fail 
because they could not provide adequate return on
investment.
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A set of success factors, as well as failure factors
if considered, were summarized afterwards by varies 
literatures. Corporations would have much chances of 
success if they followed these "golden rules" that made
LBO firms successful in the 1980s. These include:
1) Pay the right price
2) Invest other people's money
3) Invest with an edge - management
4) Understand the risks
5) Understand the acquisition process
6) Focus on cash flows and market values
7) Buy wholesale
8) Undertake commonsense strategies.
Moreover, most Leveraged Buyout shared many
characteristics:
1) Most target companies have tremendous hidden
capital, or "improvement room." Leveraged Buyout
can use corporate restructuring, redefine
products and services, cost reduction, raise
capital to provide abnormal return for its
investors.
2) The target companies have potential in reducing
agency cost.
21
3) The target companies are usually in the mature 
industry. Leveraged Buyout use financial 
leverage to buy off the company, and then use 
the cash flow generated from the operation to 
pay the debt. Therefore, cash flow stability is 
critical for Leveraged Buyout's success. Mature 
industry usually has higher stability then 
embryonic industries.
4) The management has access to capital market, and 
experience in dealing with financial and legal 
professionals. The process might be assisted by 
professional Leveraged Buyout consultants.
5) Leveraged Buyout usually goes public after 
certain period of time.
Development of China Financial Market and 
Financial Legal System
China's securities market has been through a long
turbulent environment since it was initiated in 1990s. The
development of regulation and procedures were both
economic and political process, with the stronger forces 
from political side. Since its infant stage, the market 
has been full of speculators, as well as gamblers in a 
sense. Disaster type of financial pressure on stock market 
provided strong voice for central government intervention.
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The basic institutional framework for securities industry- 
regulation was established in the late 1990s Investors' 
dissatisfaction about the market have pressured regulators 
to improve the regulation system and expedited maturing 
process of the market. Consequently, market has turned 
attention from building rules and regulations into
reinforcement of them.
China's stock market was intentioned to be an
experiment when it was first introduced in 1990. Without 
much of experience and expertise in securities market and 
regulations in place, it is very sensitive about the 
future of the securities market, and more important its
compatibility with social environment. After careful study 
and rapid introduction of western style security 
regulation, today, by 2001, China's securities market has 
grown to the second largest security market in Asia.
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were monitored and 
regulated by local People's Bank of China and local 
governments. Local governments were the main players in 
developing the growth of these infant markets. Due to 
their economic needs, these markets grow rapidly with very
limited regulatory framework. On the other hand, People's
Bank of China was under local authorities ac the time.
However, in 1992, the central government decided to
23
centralized the control of securities regulatory system
after protests related to corruptions and unregulated 
growth in stock exchange. The establishment of State
Council securities committee and china Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) formalized controlling 
mechanism that the central government agency supervises
the stock exchange and local government oversees its
operation. National People's Congress soon then initiated
the draft of Securities Law, which is based on existing 
practice. Securities Law significantly strengthened 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange, which were directly 
supervised by Securities Regulatory Commission. Securities 
Law takes into effect in 1997, which represents a 
benchmark in China's financial market development.
Securities Regulatory Commission itself however, is not a
representative of government agency. The State Council
Securities Committee is merely a coordinating
organization, which includes members from fourteen state 
agencies, such as The State Planning Commission, The 
Ministry of Finance, The Central Bank, The Economic Reform
Commission, and the Supreme People's Court. Securities 
Regulatory Commission is lack of legal authority to 
enforce the regulatory and rules without local 
government's assistant. Securities Regulatory Commission
24
has parallel authority in securities regulation with State
Planning Commission, The Economic Reform Commission, The
Ministry of Finance, and the People's Bank of China. The
local securities committees were neither part of■local 
governments nor the field offices of the Securities
Regulatory Commission.
The Chinese government has keenly awareness of 
growing economic and political significance on stock
market. The government starts to put serious efforts on
curbing speculation and manipulation in stock trading. 
Regulators penalized a number of bank branches and
brokerages that engaged in illegal activities. On December 
16, 1996, the People's Daily published a special 
commentary on regulatory activities and pointed to the 
various problems in the stock market and warning investors
to beware of investment risks. The market indices took a
dive after the release of the article, however, recovered 
quickly. After, Regulators then used the adjustment of IPO 
quotas and of the stamp tax on stock trading. Regulators 
issued two major regulations to reduce the flow of funds
into the stock markets in May-June 1997. The first is 
State Council Securities Committee, the People's Bank of
China, and State Economic and Trade Commission banned
state-owned firms and listed companies from trading in
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stocks. The second, the People's Bank of China prohibited 
banks from allowing various forms of funds into stock 
trading and speculation. And financial market bubble
finally busted.
The market volatility and rapid speculation also 
prompted the central authorities to rethink of the 
regulatory framework for the securities industry. In
August 1996, the State Council Securities Committee issued 
the Regulations on Managing the Stock Exchanges. In this
new released regulation, the Securities Regulatory
Commission was authorized to directly oversee and manage
the stock exchanges, including the authority to nominate,
with the concurrence of the local governments, the
chairman and vice chairman of the boards of the exchanges 
as well as the general manager and deputy general manager
of the exchanges. The balance of regulatory authority 
clearly tilted toward the center.
Asian financial crisis accelerated the efforts by the 
central authorities to gain direct monitoring over the
stock markets. China government recognized that in most
developed countries, government regulate their securities 
exchanges under one nationwide unified authority rather 
than parceling out regulatory authority to local
governments. In August 1997, just before the fifteenth
26
Party Congress launched new reform initiatives, the State 
Council empowered the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission to directly oversee the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock markets rather than leave them to the dual
leadership of the municipal governments and China
Securities Regulatory Commission. With this regulatory 
change, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
promptly appointed its own choices for the general manager 
and deputy general managers of the stock exchanges. In the 
meantime, the amended Criminal Law included provisions for 
prosecuting securities-related crimes including illegal 
issuance of stocks, insider trading, the spread of false
information and other forms of stock manipulation. Most 
importantly, the financial crisis in the rest of Asia 
prompted central leaders, notably president Jiang Zemin,
to push for the enactment of the Securities Law.
The central government did not just take over the
stock markets, but also the revenue on stamp tax on
securities transactions. Central government took 88
percent of the total revenue in stamp tax and left 12
percent to local authorities. And the State Council 
further the central government's stake to 91 percent in 
2000, to 94 percent in 2001 and 97 percent in 2002. Stamp 
tax revenue reached 24.5 billion yuan for 1999 and 26.7
27
billion yuan for the first half of 2000, making it one of 
fastest growing tax source.
The growing size of the stock markets and rapidly 
expanding scope of public involvement indicates that the 
market can be an important economic institution, which the 
central government will not leave behind. Therefore, in
1997 National Conference on Financial Work also decided to
reform the administrative organization for securities 
regulation. In 1998, while the restructuring of the 
People's Bank of China, the central government forfeit the 
local government authority to a national unified 
securities management system. Under this direct and 
unified leadership, China Securities Regulatory
Commission, all the local regulatory authorities became
branch offices representing China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. China Securities Regulatory Commission 
requires its branch offices emphasis on the protection of
investors through regulation, standards, and discipline.
In July 1, 1999, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission's branches became operational nationwide, thus
forming a centralized and unified network of securities 
supervisors.
There are more than 60 million brokerage accounts in 
China and the political implication of a falling marketing
28
can devastate the stability of political situation.
Despite the warning from securities publications, 
websites, and broadcast programs, more than 50% percent of 
stocks in the market maintains price/earning ratio at 
50-60. Securities regulators and national leaders concern
the consequences if the stock market does fall. The 
political importance of the securities markets has 
attracted much concern from the National People's 
Congress. In 2001, the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee sent an inspection team to four cities to learn
about the implementation of the Securities Law. The result
of investigation was not satisfied by National People's 
Congress. The inspection team reported issues like
corporate governance, disclosure of unreliable
information, stock price manipulation, and failure of 
majority owner to pay dividends, majority owner taking 
funds from listed companies at the expense of minority 
investors, corporate managers not using raised funds for 
indicated purposes, violation of laws and regulations by 
brokerages, incompatible law enforcement between the 
Ministry of Finance and the courts, and provide false 
information in order to go public. The inspection team 
also reported that some local governments have been
involved in various reorganizations of listed firms, which
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makes it difficult for securities regulators to de-list 
the companies underperformed. The National People's 
Congress therefore launch a series of political actions to 
urge reform of China Securities Regulatory Commission.
The government was in alliance with increasingly
diverse financial press to promote and protect the
minority interest. The one the most influential press
Financial and Economic Review has released a series of
articles to expose problems and issues of market
manipulation and false accounting by some companies. Some 
once high-flying companies therefore attracted 
investigation by Internal Revenue Services and China
Securities Regulatory Commission after reported by
Financial and Economic Review.
Under the pressure from public expectations, press
criticism, and legislative demands, China Securities
Regulatory Commission has launched many internal many 
internal reform themes and become more transparent to
outside investors. For example, China Securities
Regulatory Commission was looking for public opinion for a 
set of guidelines which requiring listed companies to have 
independent directors in 2001. In 2001, only 204 listed 
companies out of more than 1200 companies had independent 
directors. The proposed guidelines required all
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domestically listed companies to have at least one third 
of directors to be independent directors within a year.
The public showed very positive response to the guidelines 
because majority owners can conduct transactions at the
expense of minority shareholders before the guidelines
were reinforced.
The Chinese securities and futures exchanges have
been develop merely a decade. It has not only employed
advanced technologies but also adopt the modern securities
exchange regulatory system. In many areas, Chinese
financial markets are not advanced enough to support many 
financial activities and transactions such as funding for 
Management Buyout. But a joint effort among banking, 
securities, and insurance regulators was initiated in 
Shanghai in mid-2000 to strengthen information sharing and
coordination.
Current Management Buyout Market in China 
In the past 50 years, China central government
directly owned majority enterprises in China, which also 
made it the largest employer of the country. The 
government directly assigns goals and tasks to these
enterprises, and designates management team. The whole
economic system is also called "planned economy". Though
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government achieved firmed control over these enterprises, 
it also created a huge burden on its shoulder. Employment, 
retirement, health and medical become the obligation of 
government. Since early 1980s, China gradually open its 
door to world economy, the current control mechanism 
appears very inefficient and lack of competitiveness in 
dealing with foreign competitors. In 2001, with China's 
entering World Trade Organization, efficiency, employment 
and corporate governance issues become even more critical
than ever. Therefore, China government start privatizing
and unloading shares of these state-owned enterprises, in 
order to improve efficiency, corporate governance, and 
shift employment burden to private enterprises and
investors.
With the push from both economic and political side,
Merger and Acquisition activities increased tremendously
during past three years. Boston Co.'s research shows that 
Merger and Acquisition in China increased at a rate of 70% 
annually over the past five years, making the country the
third largest Merger and Acquisition market in Asia.
Thompson Accounting Services statistics shows total 155 
deals worth $11.9 billion in the second quarter of 2002 
(Feng, 2003) . Among varies types of Merger and Acquisition 
activities, Management Buyout and ESOP emerged as new
32
methods for reducing state-owned corporate shares.
Currently, State government owns about 6,600 billion Yuan 
in corporate assets, and 2/3 needs to be sold or 
restructured (Fei, 2002). From 2000 to 2002, Management 
Buyout activities are increasing at a promising trend.
Even public traded companies start seeking ways out to 
Management Buyout. For example, public traded companies Te 
Bian Dian Gong (600089), Sheng Li Gu Fen (000407), Tong 
Ting Shui Zhi (600257) already completed their Management 
Buyout process. In foreign capital sources, U.S. capital 
has become a forceful power in the China business economic 
environment as well as Merger and Acquisition market. It 
is reported that Citibank is in negotiations with the 
Shanghai Pu Dong Development Bank for the purchase of a 
stake of 8-10 percent; the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corp. (HSBC) has reached an agreement with the Beijing 
City Commercial Bank on becoming.a shareholder. Many 
believe that allowing foreign investors to acquire part of 
equities of state-owned enterprises is a turning point in 
the development of China's securities market. Foreign 
investors can not only introduce foreign capital, advanced 
technologies and managerial expertise but also speed up 
the process of reducing state-owned shares, and therefore
change the corporate governance structure. The U.S.
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private-equity fund New-bridge capital Ltd. topped Chinese 
media coverage recently as the would-be buyer of a listed 
Chinese bank, the first foreign acquisition of its kind in 
China. It is learned that it plans to buy 15% of the stake
of the Shenzhen Development Bank for 1.5 billion Yuan and
become its largest shareholder.
Meanwhile, China's private capital is also
aggressively pursuing buyouts. There are a few public 
companies is in the process or completed their Management 
Buyout, which includes Yutong Bus, Wan Jia Le etc. 
Management Buyout has received broad attention from many
different areas.
Merger and Acquisition also take place in the fields 
of insurance, automobiles and public services. For
instances, the U.S. based General Motors (GM) owns 34
percent equity of SAIC-GM-Wuling Automotive Co. Ltd. (the
former Liuzhou Wuling Automotive Co. Ltd. (Under the
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp.) with an investment of 
$30 million; and General Des Eaux of France has acquired a 
50 percent stake of the Shanghai Water (Pu Dong) Co. with
an investment of 2.03 billion Yuan.
During the first 10 months of 2002, there were 495 
Merger and Acquisition deals signed by Chinese listed 
companies with foreign partners, with the transaction
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volume totaling 41 billion Yuan. Lately, the trend has
become stronger, with further opening of state shares to
foreign capital. The year 2002 was regarded as a "year of
foreign Merger and Acquisition in China." However, the 
interesting part is, most Management Buyout transactions
are not aware by the public.
Despite the growing potential of Merger and
Acquisition, Management Buyout in China hardly received 
support from banks because the banking industry is not
allowed to fund Management Buyout transactions under 
current financial legal system. However, Management Buyout 
market still had substantial growth during the last two 
years. Lack of capital sources set some barriers on debt
financing, but management employed many indirect ways to 
acquire capital resources. Some experienced investment 
bankers described process as "You can do it, but you can't
talk about it." The reason behind the statement is that
though there are no rules for alternative capital to
support Management Buyout transactions, there are no rules
to forbid alternative capital resources either, which
stimulated "creativity" in this area.
Management team in Management Buyout transactions is 
both purchaser and employee, and therefore is a very 
sensitive area in Merger and Acquisition. In many
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developed countries, rules and regulations usually pay 
particular attention to this type of Merger and
Acquisition to prevent- kick-back arrangements. There are
no special rules and regulations applicable to Management 
Buyout transactions in China yet." Since October 2002,
China has promulgated a series of policies and regulations 
to unlock transferring state-owned shares to private and 
overseas investors, two major directives are "Public 
companies merger procedure" and "Notice of Issues 
Concerning the Transferring State-owned Corporate Shares". 
These policies and regulations have been marked as major 
breakthrough in Merger and Acquisition policies and rules. 
Management Buyout was addressed as a special type of 
Merger and Acquisition activity in "Notice of Issues 
Concerning the Transferring State-owned Corporate Shares". 
The only real regulatory base for Management Buyout is 
"Public companies merger procedure", which was published 
in Sep 28, 2002 and become effective on Dec 1, 2002. This 
procedure becomes the most important regulation in public 
company merger and acquisition activities, which 
recognized Management Buyout as a special Merger and 
Acquisition model and entailed basic legal requirements 
for Management Buyout transactions. For instances, it 
requires during negotiation process of Management Buyout,
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the Chairman of the company is required to address the 
impact on the company future and it is mandatory to hire 
an independent financial consultant and other professional 
consultants. The result of consulting services should be 
publicized and financial consultant fee should be paid by 
the company. The regulation set the same requirements on 
the acquisition side, which requires independent financial
consultant to "analyze targeted Company's financial 
condition, fairness of acquisition contract, and potential 
impact on company operation". Management must allow 
Chairman and third-party financial institutions
independently investigate the Management Buyout
transaction. But the regulation did not specify
requirements in source of capital, payment schedules and 
many other in-depth issues.
At the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China, the Chinese leadership stated that utilizing 
foreign capital should be combined with restructuring
state-owned enterprises. Li Rongrong, Minister of the
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), explained the
purpose of unlocking state-owned shares is to restructure 
and reform state enterprises by making use of foreign 
capital more quickly and effectively. Minister of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guang Sheng made the
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announcement in a forum that state departments are in the 
process of writing new rules and policies to encourage 
foreign investors' Merger and Acquisition activities in 
China. In response, Investment banks start taking actions 
to establish the framework to support Management Buyout
transactions. A few financial institutions, such as
Citibank, wutong funds, Hongta Investment fund, and
Shenzhen State Investment, will work collectively to
establish the first Management Buyout fund in Shanghai. At 
the same time, Shanghai Asian Business Enterprise 
Consultants LLC also initiated the project of establishing 
the first Management Buyout investment institution.
Sheng Li Gu Fen Management Buyout - Example 
of Management Buyout Process in China
Shandon Sheng Li Gu Fen was established by Sheng Li 
Group in 1994, and has been listed in Shenzhen Stock
Market Since 1996. In the early days, the main businesses 
include wholesaling and retailing of finished petroleum 
products, international trade, and real estate
development. Since 1994, the company successively invested 
200 million Yuan in Plastics Pipe Field; In 1997, it 
involved in Agricultural Chemical Industry by investing in 
holding more than half of total shares of Shandong 
Greenland Chemistry Co.,Ltd.; In 1998, the company
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established a joint venture called Shandong Sheng Li 
Biology Technology Co.,Ltd. with the Institute of Plant 
under Science Academy of China, which goes in for the 
research and development of biology technology; Since 
2000, "Sheng Li Biology Technology Industrial Zone" has
been constructed in the Jinan High-new Technology
Development Zone, which symbolizes an overall involvement 
in biology technology industry.
Shandong Sheng Li Gu Feng has very diversified owner 
structure. The largest shareholder, Dong Sheng Bang 
Investment (investment holding company created by Sheng Li 
Group) holds 41 million shares, 17.31% of total shares; 
the second largest shareholder, Tong Bai Hui, a Guangzhou 
based public-traded company, hold 36 million shares,
15.15% of total shares, only a slight 1.16% difference.
Sheng Li Group has been fighting for a long time trying to 
control the votes. In 1999, Tong Bai Hui hold 13.77% of
total shares, Shandong Sheng Bang holds only 6.98%. Since
March, 2000, these two largest shareholders start fighting
for the control of votes. Shandong Sheng Bang Investment
received shares from Shandong State Property Bureau and 
Shandong Advertisement Corporation and increased ownership 
to 15.34% and become the largest shareholder. In the mid
of March, Tong Bai Hui increased 2.98% of total shares to
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16.67% through public bids, and took back the control of 
votes. Shandong Sheng Bang soon after acquired 0.67% 
shares from Shandong local construction company, Shandong 
Dong Yin Ying Xia Construction, to control the votes
again. Since Tong Bai Hui promoting Internet concept, and
Shandong Sheng Bang insist Biotech vision, the fight of
control has never been ceased since then.
• In September, 2002, Sheng Li Gu Fen (000407) became 
the first Management Buyout in Shandong province. This was 
the first Management Buyout of state-owned enterprise in 
Shandong province.
Jul. 23, 2002, Sheng Li Investment LLC was registered 
and formed by 43 nature person; all of them are employees 
of Sheng Li Group. From the report of the Board, Sheng Li 
investment has net assets totaled 110 million yuan, the 
main business is investment. The largest shareholders are 
the high ranked managers; include Jianguo Xu, Yin Ma,
Lizhu Shui, and Peng Wang etc. Every of these largest 
shareholders own 3.18% of the total share evenly. The rest 
shareholders came from Shandong Dong Sheng Bang Investment
Group and Sheng Li Group management team.
Jul. 24, 2002, Sheng Li Group, the proxy agent of 
state-owned shares, signed Ownership Transfer Agreement 
with Sheng Li Investment LLC. In Sep. 18, 2002, Sheng Li
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Group then made amendment to the Ownership Transfer 
Agreement, transferred 16,410,000 shares (6.85% of total 
shares) from State Property Management Office to Sheng Li
Investment LLC, at 2.27 Yuan per share.
Sep. 17, 2002, Sheng Li Group made announcement that
Shan Dong government approved Stock Ownership Transfer
Agreement.
Nov. 10, 2002, Sheng Li Group signed Stock Ownership 
Transfer Agreement with Sheng Li Investment LLC to
transfer additional 25,890,000 shares (10.8% of total
shares) of Sheng Li Gu Fen to Sheng Li Investment LLC. The 
transfer price was based on book value of Sheng Li Gu
Fen's 2002 annual report, 2.27 Yuan per share.
Nov. 11, 2002, Sheng Li Group announced that Minister 
of Finance has approved Stock Ownership Transfer
Agreement.
After stock ownership transfer, Sheng Li Investment
LLC own 42,297,100 shares (17.65% of total shares) of
Sheng Li Gu Fen, and therefore become the largest owner of 
Sheng Li Gu Fen. Sheng Li Group still holds 15,590,000 
shares (6.5% of total shares) of Sheng Li Gu Fen, listed 
as the third largest owner.
On the management side, management team wants to have 
stable control of the company to protect itself from being
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taken over. The chairman Mr. Shui Li Zhu explains that
stable ownership structure is the only way to ensure the
long term growth of the company. Company also needs an
incentive plan to allow management and employees to be
motivated to work for company's long term growth.
Another important factor that pushed Management
Buyout process is the support from Shandong local
government. Local government realized that diversification
of ownership is not a good way for the local government
and company to protect its resources. Local government is 
especially reluctant to let a local company to be 
controlled by the company from other province. Therefore, 
the Management Buyout has been blessed by local
government.
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CHAPTER SIX
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANAGEMENT BUYOUT IN
CHINA VERSUS UNITED STATES
Agency problem has tangled state-owned companies for 
many years. Government has tried varies ways to improve 
efficiency, reduce debt and agency cost of state-owned 
companies, but very often with failure. Until recently, 
privatization, leveraged buyout, merger and acquisition
showed a chance of getting out of the riddle. However, the
economic environment and financial legal system are not
completely ready for Management Buyout.
In regulatory barriers, current "Corporate Law", 
"Security law" and other rules and regulations set varies 
limitations to financial buyers. For example, "Stock 
issuing and trading procedure" requires that individual
investors are not allowed to own more than 5% of common
stock of any companies. "Security Law" limits employees' 
total stock holding can not be more than 10% of floating
volume.
In financial market, source of fund is another
barrier. Due to current regulatory constraint, debt 
financing such as bonds are not viable to most investors. 
Commercial banks have very restricted requirement on
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loans, and completely shut to Management Buyouts. The
management must find their own ways to the source of
funds. It is also the reason most companies did not
disclose the source of fund after management buyout
transaction.
Therefore, due to differences in economic
environment, financial legal systems, and ownership 
structure of state-owned enterprises, Management Buyout in 
China is dramatically different from traditional
Management Buyout.
The following context summarized 7 differences in
Management Buyout characteristics between China and United
States.
Purpose of Management Buyout
In United States, the purpose of Management Buyout is 
usually to increase profitability of the company and 
prepare for public offering. The management therefore 
usually takes very high percentage of ownership in order 
to maximize their potential benefits.
The purpose of Management Buyout in China can be 
varied depending on it came from whose perspective. It 
consequently leads to different buyout process. Indeed, it 
will be quite difficult to find two exactly the same
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Management Buyout process in China. China government's 
purpose of promoting Management Buyout is to reduce state
owned corporate shares, improve efficiency and corporate 
governance, which is somewhat similar to Management Buyout 
in United States. However, innovative management team has 
made Management Buyout a multi-purpose tool.
From the government's perspective, Management Buyout 
is similar but different from Management Buyout in United 
States. The main goal of Management Buyout is to reduce 
state-owned corporate shares, and then improve efficiency 
and corporate governance. Consequently, Management Buyout 
can be a tool to solve many long-existed problems with the 
company, which including ownership structure issue, agency 
cost, and incentive pay issue. Through Management Buyout, 
government sells its shares to management with the hope
that management team will be more motivated than ever in 
managing their "own business". Management's .Increasing 
equity stake increased un-diversifiable risks, as well as 
the potential gain of management's stock holding of the 
company. The incentives generated from increasing
ownership should motive management team to achieve better 
operational performance, and possibly result in reducing 
non-performing loans and unemployment rate issues in the 
long run.■
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However, Management Buyout from management's 
perspective is quite different from what government wants..
Besides all the good will government proposed, management 
also sees opportunity in strategic acquisition and 
incentive programs.
Management Buyout in China can be strategic 
acquisition in the purpose of claiming the ownership of 
the company. Traditional Management Buyout is usually 
financial acquisition. Due to political reasons, private 
businesses were generally not allowed to exist before
economic reform in China. In order to establish
businesses, many private investors "borrowed" state-owned 
or collective-owned title to operate private businesses. 
These "state-owned" enterprises are actually founded and 
managed by private investors. However, without switch back
to private enterprises form, these investors can never
realize their ownership. Therefore, investors, often also 
the management team, always try to claim then.r equity 
ownership of these enterprises. And Management Buyout
becomes a tool for management and investors to switch the 
title. For instance, Management Buyout of Aomeidi is a 
typical strategic acquisition rather than financial 
acquisition. Aomeidi was organized as a collective-owned 
enterprise in 1968. Founder, Mr. He Xiang Jian, with 23
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partners contributed total 5,000 Yuan to open the business 
of making bottle lids. In 2000, Aomeidi buy off all 
state-owned shares from local government through
Management Buyout.
Management also utilized Management Buyout to be an 
employee incentive program. Including both state-owned and 
private-owned companies, most Chinese companies lack of a 
way to provide incentive programs, mainly due to legal 
constraints and financial market constraints. For example, 
Sheng Fang Da designed three stock option programs for its 
management team after it went public in 1995. However, 
option market was not exist in China, and therefore, none 
of these programs were approved by State Council
securities committee and china Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). Until the success of Si Tong Management 
Buyout, Sheng Fang Da's Management realized the
opportunity to utilize Management Buyout as an incentive 
program, and then soon launched their Management Buyout.
In Management Buyout in China, management team often
combines profit-sharing programs and stock option programs
with Management Buyout process together, and create
incentive feature of Management Buyout.
Therefore, the purpose of government is to utilize
Management Buyout to reduce state-owned corporate shares,
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and the purpose of the management is to compensate 
managers' contribution. The focus of Management Buyout is 
not on returns, but on ownership structure. Investors are 
highly speculative in dealing with Management Buyouts,
rather than motivated to force changes in corporate 
management in hopes of making returns to compensate the 
opportunity cost.
Source of Capital
In United States, in order to "go private", 
management usually purchase majority shares of the target 
company through debt financing. Many financial instruments 
were available for Management Buyout. Typical financing 
options include trust funds, bank financing and junk bonds
financing.
Comparatively, there are not many financing options 
available for Management Buyout in China. Management
Buyout in China was mostly funded by personal savings and 
the borrowed fund from related parties. Since management
of state-owned companies usually was not highly
compensated, the staggering amount of personal saving the 
management provided for Management Buyout becomes the 
target of investigation by outside investors.
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The main reason of lacking source of capital for 
Management Buyout is due to limited availability of trust 
funds. Management Buyout is a very new concept in China. 
Usually only specialized trust funds will be willing to
invest in Management Buyouts. The good news is that the
market has been moving to the direction to provide more 
funds to Management Buyouts. Recently, a few Management
Buyout funds were established or work in process. For
example, Xing Hua Trust Funds raised 500 million Yuan 
capital to form Management Buyout fund. However, the scale 
is too small to meet the need of Management Buyout market. 
But it opened a new channel of capital resource for
Management Buyout.
At least at current situation, personal saving is the 
major options for Management Buyout financing in China. 
Using personal saving to fund Management Buyout 
transaction leads to the question that where the personal 
savings came from. Most employees include management team 
of state-owned enterprises have relatively low income 
compare to employees of private-owned enterprises. The 
huge amount of capital required by Management Buyout is 
not affordable by management. Investors questioned the 
source of their personal income. For example, in Yu Tong 
Bus, top management were not compensated enough to afford
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to pay for the Management Buyout price. Based on Yu Tong 
Bus's financial report, management team has a major salary 
increase in year 2000; however, is only 2.52 million Yuan 
per year in total. During its Management Buyout process,
each manager of Yu Tong Bus paid 4.37 million Yuan in
average.
Management team uses personal saving rather than
public money encouraged corruption and illegal actions.
The sensitivity of using personal saving to fund
Management Buyout transaction forced management team seeks 
for alternative source of capital, also alternative ways 
to complete the transaction. For example, Management team 
will try every way to lower the purchasing price, 
including bribe the governors, manipulate financial 
statement, debt financing without collateral, high volume 
stock incentive program etc.
Therefore, management of many state-owned enterprises 
was hesitated by the limitation of capital source in
Management Buyouts. Management team sometimes needs to be 
creative and brave to design new ways to find capital
source for the new venture.
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Capital Structure
Management Buyout is a leveraged buyout. In United 
States, debt financing represent 80% of total financing in 
Management Buyout. Leveraged Buyout firms have generated
huge returns for the investors in their funds (their
shareholders or partners) by significantly leveraging 
their equity. In the mid 1990s 9 to 1 leverage ratios were 
the norm. In today's environment, where senior bank
lending is being severely restricted, leverage ratio of 3 
to 1 are more prevalent (Marren, 1993). Capital structure 
change of targeted company caused buyer's direct and
indirect benefits in cash out. Much business' after
Management Buyout, the first thing to do is fo look for 
ways to squeeze the cash out. For example, Martin Sorrell, 
whose small British advertising agency WPP Group took over 
the giant American advertising agency J. Walter Thompson 
in 1987 for $566 million, found $100 million on JWT's
post-acquisition balance sheet in the form of undervalued
real estate Silver, 1990).
Management Buyout in China, however, is not a real 
leveraged buyout. Source of capital is contributed by 
acquirer or management team's personal saving, not 
financial institution. The targeted company's debt 
structure remains the same after Management Buyout. The
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debt pressure is mainly resided on managers' personal 
finance. Though managers might still motivated cash out 
the business, the purpose is not to cash out to pay back 
the debt of the company, rather to payback to themselves, 
which could against other shareholders' interests. For 
example, after Management Buyout, Yu Tong Bus management
announced after-tax dividend payout as high as 0.48 Yuan 
per share in year 2001, which gives management 15.84
million Yuan cash payout.
Ownership Structure
Management Buyout in United States is usually total 
buyout. There are three reasons for total buyout during
1980s. First, takeovers and financial'restructurings were 
devices the financial markets used to discipline corporate 
managers and pressure them to increase cash flows and to 
pay out more money to shareholders and other investors. 
Second, the rational for apply this discipline is most
compelling when firms have free cash flow, defined as cash
flow in excess of that needed to fund investment
opportunities. Finally, the return on investment required
by the financial markets (the cost of capital) rose to
unusually high levels in 1980s. Real interest rates on
government securities and other safe financial
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instruments, which had hovered between zero and 2 percent
since the mid-1950s, rose to 6 to 8 percent in the
mid-1980s, driving-up the returns investors required for 
risky investments such as corporate stocks. Meanwhile, the 
returns to capital earned by firms in many iiidustries were 
low during the 1970s and declined even further in the
recession of 1981-82.
Management Buyout in China is target to relative
control rather than total control of the target companies. 
It is not totally "go private". Based on the requirement 
of "public company merger procedure", the public company 
itself can not provide any assistance in capital source. 
Management will not have enough resource to finance the
buyout process. As a result, management usually has only
6-36% total ownership after buyout.
Management Buyout in United States caused high
concentration of equity ownership. The tradeoff which 
determines the optimal degree of concentration is due to 
two agency problems: (1) The managers of the firm may 
engage in empire building, thereby reducing expected cash 
flows and (2) employees may shirk and under-invest in 
effort. Ownership Concentration has opposite effects on 
the significance of these two agency problems. Intuitively
it mitigates the first agency problem but it tends to make
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the second one more severe. Both features are due to the
fact that a more concentrated ownership structure
internalizes more of the benefits from monitoring and thus 
increases the amount of monitoring that takes place. On 
the one hand this reduces the amount of empire building by 
the manager since active shareholders disallow projects 
which only serve to create private benefits to the
manager. On the other hand, increased shareholder
monitoring has a negative effect on the effort invested by 
employees. This effect is slightly more complicated. The 
tradeoff can explain a change from diffuse ownership 
structures to highly concentrated ones observed during a 
leveraged buyout and then a reversion back to a more 
diffusion ownership structure. This occurs if initially a 
concentrated ownership structure is desirable to reduce 
empire building by the manager and to breach existing 
contracts with employees. After this restructuring it 
becomes optimal to switch to a more diffuse ownership 
structure to make implicit contracts feasible.
Management Buyout in China has relatively diverse 
ownership. It acquired much less percentage of the equity 
compare to United States version. In most cases,
management holds 25% of•total shares in average after 
Management Buyout. The purpose is to gain control in fact,
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rather than absolute control. Even so, Management Buyout
in China might cause the same results as in United States. 
Small shareholders do not have adequate ownership to 
control the votes, though 75% shares were hold by them.
The managers of the firm may still engage in empire 
building, and employees may shirk and under-invest in
effort.
Management Buyout is multi-lateral buyout in United
States; Based on KKR's experience, financial buyers 
usually will select the key personnel of the target 
company who would be valuable to the company operation. 
Financial buyers provide attractive number of shares to
management to ensure the continuity of the operation and
retention. After Management Buyout transaction, equity 
ownership usually composed of top level management team, 
general partners (KKR), and limited partners (capital 
providers).
Management Buyout in China is also multi-lateral but 
involved more parties. Ownership structure usually 
includes from top to middle level management team, holding 
company's management team, and subsidiary company's 
management team, sometimes even regular employees.
Therefore, Management Buyout in China is similar to an
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employee benefit program rather than traditional meaning
of Management Buyout.
Buying Process
In United States, Leveraged Buyout firms were usually 
abided by certain predefined acquisition rationale. In the 
first stage of processing, Leveraged Buyout firms
primarily rely on a set of generic criteria regarding 
industry-level dynamics and financial benchmarks. While
many Leveraged Buyout firms are similar in their basic
criteria for takeover candidates (mature industries,
stable cash flows, low operational risk), some of them
have successfully differentiated themselves from the 
industry mainstream through a specialization strategy (Why 
financial buyers doing better).
Management Buyout in China generally lack of generic 
criteria for industry-level dynamics and financial 
benchmarks. The initial stage of buying process mostly 
concerned employee benefits programs, corporate 
governance, incentive program for management etc. As
previously stated, Sheng Fang Da launched its Management
Buyout process simply because its management consider it 
is a feasible way of its employee benefit program.
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The second stage of Management Buyout in United 
States is the acquisition process. Standard Two Stage 
Auction Process in designed to eliminate the situation 
when corporate executives get emotional involved in a deal 
and end up overpaying for a target company.
Management Buyout in China usually employed a less 
direct way to process the transaction. Management teams do 
not directly acquire shares; rather they acquire shares 
through an independent investment company, such as a trust 
company and security investment company. The Investment
Company usually is fully owned by the management team. For
example, Aomeidi and Dong Ting Shui Zhi both formed 
Investment Limited Liability Corporation prior to buyout
process.
The reason that management usually does not purchase
stocks directly through secondary market or through 
auction process is because the purchasing prices would be 
much higher this way. Most companies completed its 
Management Buyout process through negotiation with state
government because state government usually has majority 
ownership of the company. Based on currently legal system, 
Employee Stock Holding Company is a preferred buyer in 
Management Buyout process. However, most Employee
Shareholder Holding Companies are only organized and
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regulated at local government level. Therefore, in the 
second stage, public companies' focus is seeking for the 
support from local government and permission for its
Management Buyout.
In the last stage of buyout, a key idea of financial 
acquirers is the "acquisition competence", according to 
which they can specialize and develop capabilities in 
redesigning and enforcing highly powered incentive and
control systems, thereby achieving systematic value 
creation through enhanced utilization of existing 
resources as well as development of new ones, without the 
exposure to the costs of post-acquisition integration 
processes. Therefore, the last stage of Management Buyout
is to restructure the targeted company in its financial
structure, in order to maximize the utilization of its
financial resource.
Management Buyout in China mostly has not done much 
after its completion. Instead of focusing on improving 
operating efficiency, many companies' management start 
worry about their personal debts and start paying higher
dividends.
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Valuation I
Valuation is the core techniques for investment
i
bankers. However, most Management Buyout in China lack of
j
systematic approach in valuation. Most management buyout
Iemployed negotiated price, or book value price.
Fair market value is defined by Internal Revenue
Services as "the price at which a property would change
i
hands between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to' sell, and both
i
having reasonable knowledge of the factjs. " In the majority
i
of purchase decisions the fair market value of the good or
i
service being sold has been determined iover numerous
transactions. This is also true, in a macroeconomic sense,
i
with regard to pricing acquisition transactions. However, 
in a transaction involving a business, jthe market value of 
the target is often not well defined, principally because
the market can be very thin, with only!a handful of
i
potential buyers. It is difficult to determine the market 
value of a company for several reasons i Value depends on 
who a prospective buyer is and what knowledge the buyer
I
possesses. Furthermore, value also depends on the process
that will be used to realize value. Finally, valuation is
i
difficult because each company is one of a kind. During 
Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout sometimes is
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considered as a side program for financial capitalist to 
squeeze the cash out of the target company to pay for the 
debt. The support of management team will be an important 
factor to accomplish this target. Therefore, financial 
buyer provided management team an incentive program.
In United States, whether an acquisition makes 
economic sense depends on the expected cash flows of the 
target company. U.S. companies have policies that steer
them away from any acquisition that would dilute earnings 
or would create goodwill on their books. These policies 
exemplify corporate America's often criticized focus on
quarterly earnings instead of long-term value creation.
Cash flows do not just depend on earnings levels. Capital 
expenditures and changes in working capital investment are 
equally important cash flow variables that must be 
scrutinized. Successful Leveraged Buyout firms have always 
spent an extensive amount of time reviewing capital 
expenditure plans, pruning gold-plated corpox'ate budgets 
down to essential economic projects. The market values of 
all the target's assets, especially unwanted or unneeded 
assets, is critical information to properly analyze a 
deal. Book value and replacement value are irrelevant in
analyzing such assets.
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In most Management Buyouts in China, book value has
been considered benchmark for setting purchasing price. 
From management's perspective, Management Buyout is a way 
to compensate them as they were underpaid for a long time;
therefore, the price for Management Buyout should be very 
favorable to the management. In fact, in Te Bian Dian 
Gong's (600089) Management Buyout transaction, the book 
value was 3.36 Yuan per share, earning per share was 0.18
Yuan, return on assets was 5.54%. The company used two 
different prices in Management Buyout transactions, 1.24 
Yuan per share and 3.1 Yuan per share. The underpaid 
portion of management compensation was priced at 2.12 Yuan 
per share and 0.26 per share each.
The reason management can acquire state-owned shares 
at such a low price is because of current state-owned 
enterprises control mechanism. Though these enterprises 
are state owned, local government is fully authorized to 
approve Management Buyout transaction as well as its
valuation. As long as local government does not allow 
outside parties or independent agencies to control and 
monitor the valuation process, management can use most 
favorable price they chose. Due to conflict interest 
between local and state government, low purchasing price
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has caused state government and small investors losing
equity.
Economist Mr. Zhang Shu Guang suggest that allow the 
public investors enter Management Buyout or Leveraged 
Buyout transactions will allow the valuation judged by the 
market, not by the management or local government. If 
outside investors were allowed enter bidding process, the 
valuation would much accurate than it is right now.
Exit Strategy
Management Buyout in United States focused on short
term profitability rather than long term profitability. As 
long as the target company meets the required return, the 
company will either be sold or go public. Possible exit
strategies in United States include (i) initial public 
offering, which allows management to sell stocks to 
public, (ii) re-capitalization, which allows equity 
holders to realize return by taking a sizable dividend, 
and (iii) outright or partial sale to another strategic or 
financial buyer. Management has very clear strategies for
exit.
In China, the company will not go private after 
Management Buyout; therefore there is no need for going 
public again. The potential exit strategy for management
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could be either realize return by taking sizable dividend,
or sell to another strategic or financial buyer.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
The original purpose of Management Buyout could be 
either improve its resource allocation or optimize its 
management structure, or both. These benefits can be
realized through reducing agency cost, motivate
management, and formulate comprehensive management
monitoring system. However, Management Buyout is not the 
only solution for these issues. And there are many 
problems Management Buyout cannot solve. Though Management 
Buyout in China seems like a promising solution for 
reducing state-owned shares, it didn't solve the 
fundamental problem of agency cost. There are many factors 
can cause failure of Management Buyout in China.
At first, Management Buyout needs strong regulatory 
framework to support and regulate its activities, which is 
what China's economic environment lacks. Increasing 
management ownership is a double-edge sword. On the one 
hand, it will improve efficiency, reducing the waste and 
motivate management team; on the other hand, it cause
issues in "control the votes", which might reduce the 
efficiency in long run. In many cases, corporate raid is 
beneficial to the company. The threat of being taken over
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will force the management to be more diligent with their
performance. However, when management had certain amount 
of votes, it can easily protect its position. The rest
shareholders' decision would be hard to execute. Moreover,
many state-owned companies in China don't have a necessary
"ready" condition for Management Buyouts: a health and
effective modern corporate governance system. Because the
shareholders' interest is represented by the state
government, it is a tendency that "everybody's interest"
becomes "nobody's interest." Therefore, without sufficient
internal control and monitoring system, management could 
easily take over the total control of the company, and
management can even utilize the company's resource for its
own benefits.
Second, companies taking Management Buyout usually 
requires strong debt capacity. This can be a great 
challenge for state-owned companies, which usually already 
had high debt ratio.
Third, traditional Management Buyout usually focused 
on short-term oriented results. Targets of Management
Buyout usually have improvement room in cost reduction, 
improve profitability etc. Most state-owned companies are 
good targets for Management Buyout. However, if the 
potential in cost reduction and improve profitability have
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been fully discovered, technical improvement and continues 
improvements will be the determinant factors. Therefore, 
through Management Buyout, state-owned companies can be 
benefited only to certain stage. And it eventually relies
on technology, production, continues improvement and other
management themes.
Fourth, Management Buyout will improve management 
structure, improve corporate governance and reduce 
state-owned shares only if companies focused on improving 
operational efficiency, financial performance, and 
reducing agency cost after the successful Management 
Buyout. But in many cases, management focuses on reducing
personal debt.
Fifth, under current political background, reducing
stated-owned shares is an important reason for the
popularity of Management Buyout. The Regulation and 
Policies of Merger and Acquisition were revised many times 
in order to support Merger and Acquisition activities. 
However, the barriers on the transactions and flexibility 
of transferring the shares of state-owned companies to
private investors still unbreakable.
Sixth, domestic capital market is not ready for 
Management Buyout. The difficulty of acquiring the
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reliable source of capital for Management Buyout prevents
many potential buyouts.
In summary, through study the results of Management
Buyout in China and the factors caused its failure, the
obvious differences can be recognized between Management
Buyout in China and United States. First, Management
Buyout in China is purposely reducing state-owned
corporate shares, and Management Buyout in United States 
is to improve the ownership structure and capital
structure in order to achieve greater operational
performance. Second, Management Buyout in China usually
achieves "control in fact" rather than total control.
Management Buyout in United States usually realized total
control. Third, the company in China has less debt after 
buyout than it is in United States because management 
contributed their personal funds for Management Buyout. 
Last, Management Buyout in China usually completed through 
negotiation with government, Management Buyout in United 
States usually operated through public bidding approach.
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Table
Sheng Fang Da
Sheng Fang Da (000055)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
19990129 18.17 18.49 16.72 16.91 34,951
19990209 16.91 16.93 15.05 15.46 9,028
19990331 15.5 17.1 14.3 15.79 76,894
19990430 15.8 16.5 12.88 13.8 31,887
19990531 13.75 18.11 12.4 16.62 198,483
19990630 16.98 22.7 16.3 21.68 372,725
19990730 20.8 20.8 17.1 17.84 147,742
19990831 18 18.43 13.81 15 88,568
•19990930 15.02 16.79 14.61 14.8 77,393
19991029 15.13 15.13 13.9 14.68 17,511
19991130 14.55 15.17 14.17 14.77 26,714
19991230 14.78 15.31 13.81 14.03 36,134
20000128 14.09 15.83 13.8 14.01 76,109
20000228 14.1 17.8 14.1 16.11 127,948
20000331 16.1 20 15.28 20 252,582
20000428 20.72 22 17.81 18.16 192,389
20000531 17.8 19.08 15.55 18.21 113,309
20000630 18.28 18.7 16.5 18.43 101,657
20000731 18.7 19.87 18.1 18.41 109,619
20000831 18.41 19.56 17.5 17.54 64,709
20000929 17.6 17.62 16.2 17.18 21,937
20001031 17.18 18.78 17 17.95 37,125
20001130 17.6 19.5 17.6 17.95 94,689
20001229 17.95 20.18 17.4 20.17 129,661
20010119 20.29 22.2 19.79 20.56 143,404
20010228 20.56 20.78 15.3 16.49 57,993
20010330 16.42 17.78 15.81 17.17 56,443
20010430 17 18.88 16.95 17.66 95,402
20010531 17.75 18.4 17.28 17.45 35,140
20010629 17.45 19.9 17 18.93 141,977
20010731 18.9 19.23 16 16.12 56,757
20010831 16 16.8 13.79 14.19 40,617
20010928 14.1 14.88 13.52 14.17 15,547
20011031 14.01 14.15 11.57 12.96 16,515
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Sheng Fang Da (000055)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20011130 13 14.05 11.3 13.8 28,092
20011231 13.98 14.4 13 13.41 104,045
20020131 13.39 13.5 9.8 11.19 61,378
20020228 11.18 11.82 10.96 11.46 27,282
20020329 . 11.4 13.3 10.91 12.19 124,858
20020430 12.19 13 11.5 12.71 46,410
20020531 12.7 12.9 11.08 11.24 27,428
20020628 11.12 14.18 10.68 12.96 102,930
20020731 12.93 13.18 11.75 11.82 37,748
20020830 11.93 12.1 11.38 11.79 24,024
20020930 11.87 12.28 11.18 11.36 29,469
20021031 11.4 11.43 9.51 9.9 56,603
20021128 9.8 10.44 7.7 8.19 43,753
20021230 8.48 11.2 7.81 9.74 432,102
20030131 9.52 12.48 9.22 11.1 379,484
20030228 11.29 11.62 10.52 10.64 95,541
20030331 10.61 11.79 9.47 10 64,483
20030501 10.05 10.87 7.9 8.12 122,583
Buyout date: Jun 2001
Correlation Coefficient 0.80959
Price % change after buyout within one month -14.8%
Price % change after buyout to now -57.1%
EPS % change one year after buyout -208%
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Aomedi
Aomedi (000527)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
19990129 6.75 8.2 6.45 7.67 528,080
19990209 7.64 7.65 7.08 7.54 91,118
19990331 7.68 8.45 7.5 7.68 636,946
19990430 7.68 7.89 7 7.1 316,575
19990531 7.1 8.42 6.46 7.9 631,435
19990630 7.9 14.1 7.63 12.99 2,169,495
19990730 12.3 15.27 11.69 12.89 1,583,236
19990831 13 14.18 10.95 11.28 624,833
19990930 11.33 11.98 10.7 11.26 321,407
19991029 11.25 11.25 10.08 10.43 161,688
19991130 10.35 11.39 10.11 10.8 249,846
19991230 10.8 11.15 10.2 10.51 175,454
20000128 10.5 12.7 10.5 12.27 989,441
20000229 12.7 14.85 11.88 13.18 1,273,660
20000331 13.26 16.17 12 15.07 3,234,785
20000428 15.01 15.2 13.5 14.06 833,685
20000531 14.2 15.82 12.7 14.94 1,404,078
20000630 15 15.55 14.1 14.96 851,665
20000731 14.9 15.9 13.14 15.05 814,708
20000831 15.1 15.48 13.9 14.03 640,121
20000929 14 14.2 12.65 12.87 252,035
20001031 12.95 13.22 12.39 12.49 150,142
20001129 12.49 14.38 12.48 14 502,957
20001229 14 14.27 12.5 13.39 224,459
20010119 13.39 13.79 12.85 13.09 200,097
20010228 13.19 13.28 11.91 12.41 164,695
20010330 12.4 14.3 12.3 13.71 476,673
20010430 13.72 13.8 12.58 13.24 320,788
20010531 13 13.42 12.69 12.73 205,911
20010629 12.73 13.3 12.68 12.75 213,576
20010731 12.78 13.18 10.28 10.3 164,086
20010831 10.35 11.18 10.03 10.52 168,800
20010928 10.52 10.83 10 10.08 93,142
20011031 10.2 10.2 8.71 9.42 125,044
20011130 9.5 9.75 8.71 9.58 113,054
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Aomedi (000527)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20011231 9.6 10.86 9.6 10.12 278,310
20020131 10.12 10.19 8.72 9.74 215,561
20020228 9.7 10.06 9.57 9.86 83,618
20020329 9.88 11.17 9.52 9.65 409,739
20020430 9.55 9.93 9.19 9.53 153,618
20020531 9.5 9.54 8.28 8.32 124,576
20020628 8.3 9.85 7.9 9.6 346,381
20020731 9.6 9.68 8.78 8.8 140,189
20020830 8.85 9 8.46 8.7 100,752
20020930 8.7 8.85 8.24 8.28 62,552
20021031 8.26 8.38 7.9 8.07 51,843
20021128 8.05 8.36 6.95 7.3 92,153
20021230 7.32 7.43 6.77 6.78 100,685
20030131 6.73 7.58 6.58 7.36 242,205
20030228 7.22 7.48 7.17 7.19 148,170
20030331 7.2 7.28 6.64 6.91 101,926
20030501 6.94 7.78 6.65 6.8 484,553
Buyout date Jan 2001
Correlation Coefficient 0.93688
Price % change after buyout within one month -5.1%
Price % change after buyout to now -48.1%
EPS % change one year after buyout -40%
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Sheng Li Gu Feng
Sheng Li Gu Feng (000407)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
19990129 13.5 14.91 13.27 13.46 26,221
19990209 13.45 13.5 12.3 12.6 10,555
19990331 12.68 13.68 11.26 12.61 45,541
19990430 12.65 13.35 11.6 11.89 42,824
19990531 11.89 13.8 11.38 12.P 75,761
19990630 12.9 18.62 12.3 17.34 399,720
19990730 16.2 18 13.65 13.82 207,288
19990831 13.8 15.68 13.78 14.55 113,157
19990930 14.5 15.28 13.96 14.28 78,677
19991029 14.33 14.8 13.3 14.52 29,724
19991130 14.5 15.18 14 14.82 77,794
19991230 14.82 15.6 14.1 14.46 76,135
20000128 14.4 17.5 14.4 16.91 288,827
20000228 17.65 18.28 15.16 15.3 237,089
20000331 15.19 17.28 15 16.2 326,394
20000428 16.2 18.63 16 16.96 300,673
20000531 17.15 17.15 15.33 16.33 102,403
20000630 16.33 18.75 16.1 18.22 349,330
20000731 18.1 19.9 17 17.21 333,301
20000831 17.25 17.95 16.5 17.09 119,997
20000929 16.99 17.34 16.01 16.6 43,166
20001031 16.6 17 14.2 15.7 81,826
20001130 15.75 16.59 15.51 • 15.95 101,022
20001229 15.96 17.37 15.65 16.91 258,298
20010119 17.21 17.8 16.74 17.79 146,185
20010228 17.8 •18 ■ 16.28 17.72 159,740
20010330 17.75 18.61 17.59 18.14 224,649
20010430 18.15 ,18.99 17.81 18.28 183,989
20010531 18.3 19.5 17.51 17.71 189,234
20010629 17.7 18.23 16.82 17.45 212,318
20010731 17.5 17.88 15.08 15.13 78,380
20010831 15.35 15.6 13.71 14.46 98,163
20010928 14.44 15 13.8 14.2 50,557
20011031 14.08 14.21 11.66 12.88 80,755
20011130 12.88 13.76 11.9 13.73 119,669
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Sheng Li Gu Feng (000407)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20011231 13.76 14.3 13.21 13.8 133,370
20020131 13.88 15.48 12.4 14.6 222,587
20020228 14.61 15.78 14.48 15.07 210,302
20020329 15.1 16.07 14.71 14.85 300,136
20020430 14.98 15.6 13.58 14.29 111,095
20020531 14.3 14.5 13 13.33 81,717
20020628 13.23 15.81 13 14.87 230,952
20020731 14.74 15.39 14.47 14.47 50,405
20020830 14.73 14.99 14.31 14.79 53,757
20020930 14.65 14.9 13.9 14 47,120
20021031 14.06 1,4.06 13.05 13.56 54,341
20021128 13.56 14.09 12.53 13.09 55,131
20021230 13.2 13.37 12.34 12.37 34,279
20030131 12.1 13.3 12 13.26 97,698
20030228 12.95 13.32 12.81 13.11 44,734
20030331 13.07 13.86 13.07 13.67 108,668
20030501 13.75 15.37 13.43 14.5 326,976
Buyout date: Sep 2002
Correlation Coefficient 0.89541
Price % change after buyout within one month -3.1%
Price % change after buyout to now 3.6%
EPS % change one year after buyout -30%
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Dong Ting Shui Zhi
Dong Ting Shui Zhi (600257)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20000630 18.15 22.28 18.15 20.97 551,526
20000731 20.73 22.9 20.15 20.84 235,903
20000831 20.8 22.8 20.4 21.81 194,460
20000929 21.63 24.53 21.4 22.29 343,737
20001031 22.42 24.28 21.58 23.07 103,334
20001130 23 25.15 22.78 23.42 138,550
20001229 23.42 26.58 23.4 26 131,351
20010119 26.3 27.5 24.1 25 71,036
20010228 25 25 22.48 23.k 49,008
20010330 23.3 25.42 23 25 53,414
20010430 25 25.69 24.2 24.36 64,319
20010531 24.28 26.68 24.21 26.65 84,293
20010629 26.82 28.95 25.98 27.55 127,521
20010731 27.58 27.95 23.4 23.58 62,452
20010831 23.6 24.97 22 22.39 44,914
20010928 22.3 23.44 20.45 20.63 25,787
20011031 20.8 20.83 16.5 18.91 46,010
20011130 19.24 19.38 16.75 19.38 33,473
20011231 19.38 19.75 17.51 19.33 31,616
20020131 19.34 20.17 14.31 16.53 85,339
20020228 16.56 17.26 15.9 17 23,612
20020329 16.92 18.61 16.55 16.6 65,089
20020430 16.55 18.1 16.4 17.97 33,028
20020531 17.99 18 16 16.41 15,032
20020628 16.3 18.32 15.81 17.53 43,925
20020731 17.4 18.05 17.08 17.35 31,794
20020830 17.47 18.68 17.22 18 33,113
20020930 18 18.38 17.04 17.09 42,987
20021031 17 17.15 15.82 15.84 27,104
20021128 15.83 16.44 13.82 14.86 34,940
20021230 15.1 15.88 14.24 14.36 51,037
20030131 14.1 15.7 13.18 15.5 70,336
20030228 15.57 15.94 15.02 15.63 42,954
20030331 15.7 16.54 15.48 15.83 39,624
20030501 15.76 16.1 13.8 13.93 74,926
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Dong Ting Shui Zhi (600257)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
Buyout date: Oct 2002
Correlation Coefficient 0.89986
Price % change after buyout within one month -6.2%
Price % change after buyout to now -12.1%
EPS % change one year after buyout 5%
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Fu Shu Gu Feng
Fu Shu Gu Feng (000973)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20000531 15.9 15.9 15.02 15.51 137,306
20000630 15.5 15.58 14.6 14.8 169,005
20000731 14.8 15.29 14.26 14.74 101,639
20000831 14.76 15.7 14.36 14.89 161,454
20000929 14.85 15.32 13.88 14.19 50,747
20001031 14.19 15.09 14.01 14.62 34,248
20001130 14.62 15.67 14.53 15.2 111,375
20001229 15.23 15.61 14.5 15.17 76,710
20010119 15.2 16.1 14.87 15.27 122,966
20010228 14.88 15.05 14.2 14.7 39,892
20010330 14.73 15.39 14.7 15.33 63,568
20010430 15.44 15.8 14.5 15.06 82,844
20010531 15.16 16.83 15 16.74 223,276
20010629 16.8 17.84 16.42 16.82 199,496
' 20010731 16.8 16.86 14.99 15.09 104,109
20010831 15.33 17.4 15.13 15.8 234,843
20010928 15.79 16 13.81 13.96 54,658
20011031 13.99 14 11.01 12.95 76,220
20011130 12.9 13.32 11.26 13.31 46,760
20011231 13.29 13.4 12.08 12.88 35,665
20020131 12.95 12.95 8.95 11.26 67,573
20020228 11.38 11.68 10.8 11.2 25,676
20020329 11.18 13.05 10.66 12.13 98,289
20020430 12.05 12.51 11.7 12.34 41,937
20020531 12.35 12.35 9.3 9.6 228,525
20020628 9.58 12.09 9.32 11.07 407,543
20020731 11.11 11.48 10.7 10.7 104,976
20020830 10.95 11.05 10.35 10.77 64,504
20020930 10.7 10.89 10 10.09 36,114
20021031 10 10.06 9.32 9.4b 21,899
20021128 9.62 10.14 8.5 8.94 52,908
20021230 8.98 9.19 8.02 8.25 61,744
20030131 8.1 8.92 7.86 8.8 56,524
20030228 8.75 9.18 8.61 9.06 62,729
20030331 9.09 9.23 8 8.45 49,571
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Fu Shu Gu Feng (000973)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20030501 8.47 9.31 8.1 8.22 257,039
Buyout date: Sep 2002
Correlation Coefficient 0.87493
Price % change after buyout within one month -6.2%
Price % change after buyout to now -18.5%
EPS % change one year after buyout 41%
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Te Bian Dian Gong
Te Bian Dian Gong (600089)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
19990129 13.5 15.2 13.21 14.78 66,231
19990209 14.66 14.66 13.9 13.95 8,383
19990331 13.95 17.06 13 15.89 187,240
19990430 15.6 19.98 15.2 18.35 200,615
19990531 18.19 19.46 17.1 19.4 266,651
19990630 19.5 27.83 19.3 23.77 591,403
19990730 22.82 37.7 21.39 30.48 392,968
19990831 30.2 30.2 24.5 25.18 216,436
19990930 25.15 28.3 24.18 25.29 187,582
19991029 25.11 25.19 20.5 23.45 61,715
19991130 23.45 23.45 21 22.37 81,550
19991230 22.4 23.3 21 22.8 50,044
20000128 22.6 26.3 22.1 25.7 208,226
20000229 26.48 29 23.6 25.85 663,714
20000331 25.5 34.88 24.8 32.9 1,208,457
20000428 33.2 34 19.18 20.44 618,845
20000531 20.6 20.78 17.38 19.8 226,244
20000630 19.8 20.39 18 18.97 230,955
20000731 18.9 19.5 18.25 18.8 153,806
20000831 18.81 20.98 18.49 18.76 413,912
20000929 18.61 19 17.41 17.76 96,745
20001031 17.8 18.22 16.68 17.02 82,251
20001130 17 18.12 16.8 16.94 156,200
20001229 16.95 17.1 16.5 16.96 87,578
20010119 16.96 17.48 16.68 16.9 64,665
20010228 16.9 16.9 14.38 14.88 59,907
20010330 14.9 15.89 14.61 15.42 93,563
20010430 15.42 15.81 14.8 14.82 99,827
20010531 14.82 15.54 14.5 15.1 85,470
20010629 15.12 15.73 14.85 15.33 93,527
20010731 15.35 15.8 14.09 14.1 77,912
20010831 14.01 14.58 12.45 12.58 35,627
20010928 12.5 13.38 11.55 11.65 29,701
20011031 11.68 11.8 9.12 10.9 48,625
20011130 10.78 11.58 9.65 11.41 62,439
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Te Bian Dian Gong (600089)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20011231 11.45 11.78 10.08 10.43 44,340
20020131 10.46 10.46 8.1 9.35 49,582
20020228 9.34 9.87 9.2 9.27 20,020
20020329 9.27 11.38 9.09 10.29 151,049
20020430 10.19 10.67 9.8 10.5 97,047
20020531 10.65 10.65 8.82 8.93 37,622
20020628 8.8 10.4 8.6 10.32 77,353
20020731 10.32 10.82 10.1 10.15 91,867
20020830 10.15 10.45 9.75 10.29 31,174
20020930 10.29 10.29 9.06 9.68 14,929
20021031 9.7 9.7 8.99 9.11 11,751
20021128 9.02 9.4 7.51 7.94 23,351
20021230 8.25 8.88 7.7 8.04 86,701
20030131 7.8 9.25 7.6 8.69 44,425
20030228 8.66 8.95 8.4 8.69 54,014
20030331 8.7 8.79 7.9 8.53 64,330
20030501 8.52 9 8.01 8.24 136,922
Buyout Date: Apr 2002
Correlation Coefficient 0.53406
Price % change after buyout within one month -15.0%
Price % change after buyout to now -21.5%
EPS % change one year after buyout 0%
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Yu Tong Bus
Yu Tong Bus (600066)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
19990129 13.5 14.91 13.27 13.46 26,221
19990209 13.45 13.5 12.3 12.6 10,555
19990331 12.68 13.68 11.26 12.61 45,541
19990430 12.65 13.35 11.6 11.89 42,824
19990531 11.89 13.8 11.38 12.9 75,761
19990630 12.9 18.62 12.3 17.34 399,720
19990730 16.2 18 13.65 13.82 207,288
19990831 13.8 15.68 13.78 14.55 113,157
19990930 14.5 15.28 13.96 14.28 78,677
19991029 14.33 14.8 13.3 14.52 29,724
19991130 14.5 15.18 14 14.82 77,794
19991230 14.82 15.6 14.1 14.46 76,135
20000128 14.4 17.5 14.4 16.91 288,827
20000228 17.65 18.28 15.16 15.3 237,089
20000331 15.19 17.28 15 16.2 326,394
20000428 16.2 18.63 16 16.96 300,673
20000531 17.15 17.15 15.33 16.33 102,403
20000630 16.33 18.75 16.1 18.22 349,330
20000731 18.1 19.9 17 17.21 333,301
20000831 17.25 17.95 16.5 17.09 119,997
20000929 16.99 17.34 16.01 16.6 43,166
20001031 16.6 17 14.2 15.7 81,826
20001130 15.75 16.59 15.51 15.95 101,022
20001229 15.96 17.37 15.65 16.91 258,298
20010119 17.21 17.8 16.74 17.79 146,185
20010228 17.8 18 16.28 17.72 159,740
20010330 17.75 18.61 17.59 18.14 224,649
20010430 18.15 18.99 17.81 18.28 183,989
20010531 18.3 19.5 17.51 17.71 189,234
20010629 17.7 18.23 16.82 17.45 212,318
20010731 17.5 17.88 15.08 15.13 78,380
20010831 15.35 15.6 13.71 14.46 98,163
20010928 14.44 15 13.8 14.2 50,557
20011031 14.08 14.21 11.66 12.88 80,755
20011130 12.88 13.76 11.9 13.73 119,669
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Yu Tong Bus (600066)
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20011231 13.76 14.3 13.21 13.8 133,370
20020131 13.88 15.48 12.4 14.6 222,587
20020228 14.61 15.78 14.48 15.07 210,302
20020329 15.1 16.07 14.71 14.85 300,136
20020430 14.98 15.6 13.58 14.29 111,095
20020531 14.3 14.5 13 13.33 81,717
20020628 13.23 15.81 13 14.87 230,952
20020731 14.74 15.39 14.47 14.47 50,405
20020830 14.73 14.99 14.31 14.79 53,757
20020930 14.65 14.9 13.9 14 47,120
20021031 14.06 14.06 13.05 13.56 54,341
20021128 13.56 14.09 12.53 13.09 55,131
20021230 13.2 13.37 12.34 12.37 34,279
20030131 12.1 13.3 12 13.26 97,698
20030228 12.95 13.32 12.81 13.11 44,734
20030331 13.07 13.86 13.07 13.67 108,668
20030501 13.75 15.37 13.43 14.5 326,976
Buyout date: J un 2001
Correlation Coefficient 0.89541
Price % change after buyout within one month -13.3%
Price % change after buyout to now -16.9%
EPS % change one year after buyout 9%
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Sheng zhen Index
Date Open High Low Close Volume
19990129 2,945.23 2,987.26 2,823.62 2,920.39 80,853,809
19990209 2,917.94 2,942.33 2,705.54 2,755.30 17,721,163
19990331 2,760.55 2,949.29 2,744.16 2,872.15 117,309,397
19990430 2,870.09 2,987.41 2,739.62 2,793.45 160,580,087
19990531 2,793.20 3,352.55 2,521.08 3,270.34 208,208,090
19990630 3,277.05 4,896.04 3,239.04 4,702.77 508,601,799
19990730 4,669.77 4,669.77 3,628.55 4,045.35 315,567,248
19990831 4,075.14 4,225.33 3,861.15 4,154.20 190,487,726
19990930 4,158.02 4,318.04 3,951.09 3,967.08 122,218,341
19991029 3,963.07 3,967.27 3,598.74 3,742.01 94,053,153
19991130 3,742.62 3,811.32 3,525.76 3,533.98 121,865,057
19991230 3,530.03 3,632.05 3,284.79 3,369.61 71,661,017
20000128 3,374.11 3,952.41 3,360.21 3,952.41 249,265,475
20000229 4,102.65 4,685.48 4,039.87 4,484.16 333,163,195
20000331 4,468.97 4,635.67 4,100.78 4,532.31 483,522,956
20000428 4,523.90 4,685.38 4,381.85 4,683.17 310,891,774
20000531 4,708.53 4,736.72 4,275.86 4,643.15 220,673,030
20000630 4,665.01 4,875.05 4,665.00 4,830.67 211,336,900
20000731 4,806.47 4,905.51 4,697.96 4,894.13 0
20000831 4,900.54 5,062.29 4,707.05 4,826.30 0
20000929 4,800.59 4,842.36 4,424.01 4,524.70 0
20001031 4,534.85 4,654.71 4,448.20 4,573.22 0
20001130 4,573.23 5,011.03 4,572.60 4,829.99 113,259,415
20001229 4,836.63 4,869.91 4,652.22 4,752.75 222,765,942
20010119 4,756.18 4,849.25 4,610.27 4,743.36 151,616,741
20010228 4,754.24 4,764.64 4,318.52 4,453.14 111,597,310
20010330 4,455.15 5,037.51 4,455.15 4,965.98 325,769,041
20010430 4,976.97 5,091.45 4,765.01 4,802.59 359,387,275
20010531 4,810.90 4,929.26 4,784.89 4,857.46 255,969,052
20010629 4,862.19 4,874.79 4,632.20 4,716.89 246,532,078
20010731 4,720.37 4,733.32 4,043.80 4,059.00 195,700,294
20010831 4,069.10 4,177.95 3,782.53 3,860.21 162,623,951
20010928 3,861.97 3,993.22 3,468.96 3,498.62 159,775,817
20011031 3,490.27 3,615.15 3,124.57 3,438.52 160,800,293
20011130 3,445.95 3,514.03 3,146.75 3,513.75 52,623,548
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Sheng zhen Index
Date Open High Low Close Volume
20011231 3,521.27 3,613.71 3,245.50 3,325.66 13,434,297
20020131 3,319.20 3,319.25 2,661.90 2,982.69 14,280,970
20020228 2,987.67 3,104.37 2,944.26 3,029.49 8,427,251
20020329 3,022.35 3,393.44 2,969.81 3,173.90 31,283,039
20020430 3,161.10 3,275.91 3,082.33 3,253.46 16,290,352
20020531 3,255.02 3,267.01 3,014.67 3,037.00 12,590,455
20020628 3,028.03 3,575.87 2,948.71 3,551.33 31,143,658
20020731 3,556.53 3,586.06 3,396.67 3,406.54 23,322,080
20020830 3,434.49 3,499.68 3,358.57 3,436.84 12,119,872
20020930 3,438.18 3,465.07 3,236.22 3,243.93 10,431,728
20021031 3,227.46 3,227.46 2,989.78 3,036.18 8,961,368
20021128 3,035.84 3,189.14 2,757.70 2,876.89 16,693,118
20021230 2,919.09 2,938.85 2,744.65 2,771.02 15,354,965
20030131 2,743.21 3,069.12 2,673.25 3,051.22 23,657,128
20030228 3,045.01 3,082.36 2,980.86 3,054.33 15,895,984
20030331 3,058.27 3,100.97 2,954.08 3,097.28 16,727,938
20030501 3,105.28 3,525.87 3,092.63 3,260.75 62,373,030
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